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Chapter 1 - General introduction and summary
“Truly successful decision making relies on a balance between deliberate and
instinctive thinking”
Malcolm Gladwell, 2005
Decisions abound in our lives. They may range from which job you should 
take to which shampoo to buy and from which shoes to buy to whom you want to 
spend the rest of your life with (the latter two arguably equally difficult decisions 
for some people). Making decisions is not always easy, and complex decisions in 
particular can be quite a challenge (Rettings & Hastie, 2001; Germeijs, & De 
Boeck, 2002; Rassin, & Muris, 2005), for some people even more than for others 
(Frost, & Shows, 1993; W ebster & Kruglanski, 1994; Schwartz, Ward, 
Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, & Lehman, 2002).
Although mundane decisions, like adding a little more salt to your dinner, 
are made relatively quickly and without much effort or thought (Gladwell, 2005; 
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000), complex decisions usually take a 
long time and a great deal of deliberation (Payne, Bettman, Johnson, 1993; 
Johnson, & Payne, 1985; Greenleaf & Lehmann, 1995). Decisions do not always 
lead to satisfactory outcomes (e.g. Tsiros, & Mittal, 2000), so the question arises 
how we are best to make decisions.
Various decision making strategies can be identified, some of which 
include thorough conscious deliberation, some focus on intuitive strategies and 
some are mere variations of flipping a coin. Although the latter probably does not 
rank highly on most people’s list of decision making strategies, complex 
decisions sometimes leave us so dissatisfied (Tsiros, & Mittal, 2000) that in 
retrospect, flipping a coin may not have seemed such a bad idea (Ratliff, 1999). 
Few people would subscribe to this idea though. In fact, common knowledge 
dictates that thorough conscious deliberation leads to the best outcomes when 
facing a complex decision. This is indeed sometimes true, but the entire picture is 
not that simple. Contrary to common knowledge, not consciously thinking about 
a complex decision problem sometimes leads to better results than thorough
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conscious thought (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). 
Still, people do rely more on conscious thought. This reliance on conscious 
thought is a direct result of the reputation of both consciousness -  as reliable - 
and the reputation of unconscious and automatic processes, as crude and 
sometimes sloppy.
The strong reliance on conscious thought is also the result of the authority 
people ascribe to economic theories. Economists have developed various 
normative decision making strategies. They claim that some strategies are better 
than others, but that in general, consciously applying a sophisticated conscious 
weighting strategy leads to the best decisions.
Normative strategies of decision making
There is a long list of strategies people supposedly use when making a 
decision. The same decision problem can lead to different decisions, depending 
on the strategy the decision maker uses to arrive at a decision.
One of the simplest strategies is the strict lexicographic rule (LEX). When 
this strategy is applied, the most im portant attribute of choice options is 
determined and the choice option which scores highest on this attribute gets 
selected. In case of a tie between options, the second most im portant attribute is 
considered, but only for the best options on the first (most important) attribute. 
This continues until one option is chosen. This can potentially lead to suboptimal 
decisions. A hypothetical choice option which scores highest on the most 
im portant attribute but very low on all other attributes would still be selected.
The equal weights heuristic (EQW) is a ‘tally’ strategy. It ignores the 
relative importance of attributes and instead just looks at which option has the 
highest ratio of good to bad features (Payne et al., 1993). EQW is an effortless 
strategy, since all one has to do is count good and bad attributes of each decision 
alternative to come to a decision. However, the benefit of effortlessness can come 
at the cost of decision quality. Usually, not every attribute is of equal importance, 
and some weighting of attributes is often necessary (cup holders in a car should 
generally not be weighted equally to safety).
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A more complex decision making strategy is the weighted adding strategy 
(WADD; e.g., Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Edwards, 1961; Janis & Mann, 1977). 
In this strategy, the relative importance (also called ‘utility’) of various attributes 
of choice options is weighted. There are several pitfalls to this strategy. To name a 
few: The value of attributes may differ from one situation to another; we may not 
even always be knowledgeable enough to judge the utility of an attribute; 
attributes may be interdependent (for an apartment, the attribute ‘penthouse of 
a 22 story building’ seems of a high value, but may be less so when another 
attribute is ’22 story building lacks elevator’) and so on. As it turns out, even 
when we try to use this strategy, which we rarely do, we are not very good at it 
(e.g. Dawes, 1979; Swets, Dawes & Monahan, 2000) and actually, there seems to 
be no way we can be good at it (Baron, 2000).
Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) answers some of the issues of 
WADD, stating for instance that every attribute needs to be independent. Making 
decisions according to MAUT has its problems too, however. One of these 
problems is that MAUT, as all weighted adding strategies, depends fully on self­
reported indications of attribute values. Self-report depends on introspection 
and is a notoriously bad indicator of motives (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and 
relative personal value. A bigger problem is the fact that most people do not 
know how to use MAUT, and therefore refrain from using it (e.g. Dawes, 1979; 
Swets et al., 2000).
The decision strategies described above all follow certain decision rules. 
Interestingly enough, they often appear not to come close to the way people 
actually make decisions. Some strategies describe an optimal way of decision 
making, but in truth, people do not often make lists or write down the weights of 
various attributes of decision options, and even if they do, it appears close to 
impossible to compare certain attributes. Of course, many of these models are 
only normative. It is generally assumed that real life decision making does not 
conform to these models. The problem is that we cannot conform to these 
models, regardless of how much time and effort we put into a decision. So in fact, 
many decision theories paint a pretty picture of a nonexistent reality. That we do 
not achieve this reality appears to be not just because we do not try, but also
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because we are simply unable. The main point of these theories is that thorough 
conscious thought leads to optimal decision making. However, consciously 
making decisions is hard. One of the reasons for this is our inability to 
consciously give weights to attributes of a choice option. Another reason is the 
low capacity of our consciousness.
Conscious thought in decision making
There is a history of admiration for consciousness. Descartes so 
eloquently said: I think therefore I am (“Cogito ergo sum”; Descartes, 1664), and 
his views seem to be shared by, among other scholars, a host of economists and 
decision making theorists. The more complex normative strategies (like MAUT) 
assume clever conscious processes and suggest that thinking consciously helps 
to assign appropriate weights to aspects and attributes of a decision. If only it 
were that simple.
Errors in decision making
Decision making falls prey to various errors. There are reasons why we 
are not very good at weighting various attributes of a choice option. A very 
prominent reason is that context influences us. To us, the value of an attribute 
varies from one situation to another. This leads to a problem, because when we 
are asked to assign value to an attribute, we often do not realize this. Instead, we 
will judge the attribute solely by our evaluation in the specific context we find 
ourselves in. However, the context in which we judge an attribute may be very 
different from the context in which the results of our decision matter. We are 
generally not very good at judging how we will behave in a situation that differs 
from the one we are in (Nordgren, Van der Pligt, & Van Harreveld, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009; Read & Van Leeuwen, 1998; Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, Nagin, 
& Paternoster, 1997; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). If we go shopping for 
dinner just before we have had lunch, we will buy much more food than if we go 
shopping for dinner just after we had lunch (Nisbett & Kanouse, 1969). This 
occurs because we are in a ‘hot’ state of hungriness (Loewenstein, 1996). Also, 
quitting smokers judge their ability to stop smoking much higher just after they 
had a (presumably last) cigarette. The same effect occurs for dieting for example
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(Nordgren et al., 2006, 2008) and other impulsive behaviors (Nordgren et al., 
2008; Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Van Boven, Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005; 
Sayette, Loewenstein, Griffin, & Black, 2008).
Framing. Values are influenced by context. Research has shown that 
people are more willing to make an extra trip to save $5,- when the total price is 
low, than when the total price is high. When buying a $15,- calculator, people are 
more willing to make an extra trip for a $5,- extra discount than when buying a 
$125,- calculator. The same 5 dollars (and they are the exact same 5 dollars) 
appear to have a different value dependent on the context, or the framing 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). When buying a house, 5 dollars or even a 1000 
dollars may seem like a ridiculous amount to negotiate about, but these are the 
same dollars which will make you take a detour to a gas station where you get 5 
dollars discount over the course of a year, or make you decide not to buy that suit 
you liked so much. So even comparing money to money seems to become difficult 
when the context is different. People are however no less certain of their 
decisions.
Anchoring. Let’s say physicians prescribe drug A a total of 25 times a year. 
If we would ask physicians, who at that moment are not aware of the number of 
times they actually prescribe drug A, to indicate how often they prescribe the 
drug on a scale ranging from 1 to 50, we might get a number close to 25. 
However, if we were to ask the same physicians the same question on a scale 
ranging from 1 to 500, their estimate will be much higher. The scale end-points 
function as an ‘anchor’, telling us what would be a reasonable response (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981). This is also the reason why a wine list in a restaurant 
sometimes boasts a few bottles of extremely expensive wines. The most 
expensive wines are never sold; the restaurant may not even have them in stock. 
However, guests will choose a 30 euro bottle of wine sooner than when they 
would have found a 80 euro bottle of wine at the top of the wine list. The 
expensive wine makes the 30 euro bottle of wine seem less expensive. Likewise, 
an anchor can influence the weight we give to an attribute in a decision problem.
Availability heuristic. When people are asked to estimate how many 
people die of AIDS, traffic accidents or homicide, they tend to overestimate the
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number of deaths from homicide and underestimate the number of AIDS related 
deaths. This is caused by the information they have available, and newspapers 
cover more homicides than AIDS related deaths. The heuristic they apply is 
called the availability heuristic, and it is a well-studied phenomenon (e.g. Combs 
& Slovic, 1979). As it turns out, thinking more in this case results in more bias 
from this heuristic. When given 12 seconds to answer this question, the bias was 
smaller than when given an added instruction to think carefully before 
answering and 45 seconds to answer (Dijksterhuis, 2003). More thinking led to 
more bias.
As demonstrated in the examples above, various errors pervade decision 
making. We intuitively blame such errors on people’s lack of motivation to 
engage in serious conscious thought. Can’t  we avoid such errors if we just 
deliberate a little more? We think that thorough conscious thought will help us 
make good decisions. However, assigning values to attributes of choice options is 
very difficult and finding an objective standard of the value of an attribute seems 
almost impossible. Although it is certainly true that conscious thought can help 
to prevent some pitfalls in decision making, the general rule that conscious 
thought makes choices and decisions better, intuitive as it may sound, is wrong. 
More motivation to think about a decision may occasionally help (for easy 
decisions for instance), but often it just leads to more enthusiastic application of 
a suboptimal strategy, leading to suboptimal outcomes (e.g., Arkes, Dawes, & 
Christensen, 1986). The more people are motivated to deliberate about a choice, 
the bigger framing effects become for instance (Igou & Bless, 2007).
Often conscious thought does not help, and sometimes it actually makes 
matters worse (Igou & Bless, 2007). The bottom-line is that the relation between 
conscious thought and quality of decision making is complicated, with multiple 
moderators affecting whether deliberation helps or hinders (e.g., Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).
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Intuitive decision making styles
Although Descartes’ idea was an interesting notion at the very least, it has 
arguably been the start of centuries of neglect and disregard of sm art automatic 
processes (Damasio, 1994; Koestler, 1964; Wilson, 2002). Many economic 
theorists and judgment and decision making experts would have you believe that 
although conscious thought does not always lead to optimal decision making (e.g. 
Baron, 2000), other decision styles, among which are more intuitive decision 
styles, are not likely to be better, and they would state so, even without research 
proving this claim (for instance, see Baron, 2000, p333).
Various automatic processes bias and influence decision making (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981; Dijksterhuis, Smith, Van Baaren, & Wigboldus, 2005). 
Framing refers to the effect the context has on how information is regarded. The 
representativeness heuristic (e.g. Kahneman, & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 
2003) refers to the fact that people overestimate the occurrence of an event 
within an entire population, based on the occurrence within a relatively small 
sample and the list goes on. These automatic processes influence not only 
various conscious decision styles, as described above, but very likely have a 
similar influence on more intuitive decision making in the form of snap 
judgments.
Snap judgments
Occasionally, decisions which may seem extremely complex, can be 
answered in a split second. Why you do not like a certain song can depend on a 
myriad of reasons and preferences, but nonetheless you can often immediately 
decide you either do or do not like that song. Snap judgments, as we might call 
them, are decisions made extremely fast, based on expertise and often a limited 
amount of information about the current decision problem (Gladwell, 2005).
Let us look at an example of how powerful snap judgments can be. 
Judging from a sound recording of a conversation between a patient and a doctor, 
people are able to estimate with a high certainty the likelihood the doctor might 
become involved in a malpractice lawsuit. Mind you, these recordings were 
altered. All high frequencies were removed, leaving a muffled noise from which it
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is impossible to understand the actual conversation. Only intonation, pitch and 
rhythm remain. Furthermore, judges were only given 2 seconds to judge the 
doctors. This extremely impoverished version nonetheless allowed the judges to 
predict which doctor would and would not be sued (Allen & Burkin, 2000; 
Ambady, Laplante, Nguyen, Rosenthal, Chaumeton, & Levinson, 2002).
Although snap judgments can be very efficient in that they require little 
energy, they usually require a good deal of expertise (Gladwell, 2005) and are 
subject to context influences. When making a snap judgment, we rely on an 
automatic process which operates primarily on previous knowledge, without 
incorporating much of the information at hand. Pattern recognition plays a great 
role, and therefore expertise aids snap judgments. The problem is that our 
previous knowledge also includes various biases including prejudice for instance. 
In this way, snap judgments, although sometimes efficient, can lead to 
suboptimal and erroneous decisions.
We know that using conscious thought as well as various intuitive 
decisions styles can lead to biases. So what to do when we have a decision which 
is more complex than choosing between one towel or another? If decision 
making based on conscious thought, as well as intuitive decision making like 
snap judgments are both influenced by the same biases, then how are we best to 
make decisions? Recent findings state that unconscious thought leads to better 
decisions.
Unconscious Thought Theory
Unconscious Thought Theory is based on six principles (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006). These principles contrast unconscious thought to conscious 
thought. The Unconscious-Thought Principle states that there are two modes of 
thought: Conscious thought and unconscious thought. The two modes have 
different characteristics, making them differentially applicable to different 
situations. The Capacity Principle states that since unconscious thought makes 
use of the large capacity of the unconscious, unconscious thought can handle 
greater amounts of information than conscious thought, which uses the relatively 
small capacity of consciousness. The Bottom-Up-Versus-Top-Down Principle
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states that conscious thought works top-down, applying schemas when coming 
to a decision. Unconscious thought works bottom-up, allowing it to come to 
decisions which do not fit a schema, and taking into account information which 
does not fit prior knowledge. The Weighting Principle states that unconscious 
thought is better at assigning appropriate weights to information. The Rule 
Principle states that conscious thought is rule-based. When making a decision, 
conscious thought can apply strict rules and is very precise, whereas 
unconscious thought only gives rough estimates. The Convergence-Versus- 
Divergence Principle states that conscious thought searches memory in a more 
focused and convergent manner, whereas unconscious thought searches memory 
in a more divergent manner, allowing it to be more creative for instance 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006).
Unconscious thought in decision making
Unconscious thought can be defined as a cognitive process in the absence 
of conscious attention (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). It is different from snap 
judgments, in that unconscious thought requires time, whereas snap judgments 
do not. In a typical unconscious thought experiment, participants were given 
information about a decision problem. Some participants were asked to 
consciously think about the information, whereas others were given a distraction 
task and engaged in unconscious thought. The common finding is that 
unconscious thought leads to better decisions (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & Van Baaren, 
2008; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006; 
Dijksterhuis, Bos, Van der Leij, & Van Baaren, 2009; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; 
Ham, Van den Bos, & Van Doorn, 2009; Lerouge, 2009).
Research in unconscious thought does not limit itself to decision making. 
Unconscious thought has also been shown to increase creativity for instance. 
After a period of unconscious thought, people do not only become more creative 
(Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006), they are also better at selecting their best idea 
(Ritter, Dijksterhuis, Van Baaren, 2010).
Sleeping on it. A conclusion often drawn from research in unconscious 
thought is that we should ‘sleep on it’ when we have to make a decision. Although 
in our experiments we have never actually let participants sleep on a decision,
15
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there is some research indicating that during sleep information is processed 
further (e.g. Ellenbogen, Hu, Payne, Titone, & Walker, 2007; Lansink, Goltstein, 
Lankelma, Joosten, McNaughton, & Pennartz, 2008; Lansink, Goltstein, Lankelma, 
McNaughton, & Pennartz, 2009). This supports the idea that sleeping on it would 
indeed be beneficial to decision making, or at least to information organization 
prior to decision making.
Dual process theory. Dual process theories abound in the literature (Evans, 
2009). Most dual process theories assume that there are two types of systems 
that underlie our cognitive processing (Chaiken & Trope 1999, Evans, 2009). One 
of these two systems typically operates quickly, is non-conscious, can operate in 
parallel with other processes, and is relatively undemanding of cognitive 
resources. The second system processes information more slowly, operates 
under volitional control, is serial in its information processing and is relatively 
demanding of cognitive resources. The first system is often associated with 
intuition, the second more with reason or rationality.
What does unconscious thought theory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) 
tell us that other dual-process theories do not? Do we really need another dual­
process theory? The answer is a resounding: Yes. First of all, most dual process 
theories assume the non-conscious, automatic system to be ‘stupid’, in that it is 
not capable of relatively complex operations but often works similar to a reflex. A 
host of research proves this idea wrong, showing complex behavior, directed 
non-consciously (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1994; Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001; 
Bargh, 1990; Bargh, 2005; Chartrand & Bargh 1996; Eitam, Schul, & Hassin, 
2009; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; 
Reber, 1967, 1989). Another assumption in most dual process theories is that the 
more conscious system, although it is slow, leads to more rationality. A host of 
research proves this idea wrong as well (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006; Kahneman, 2003), as described above.
Although unconscious thought theory agrees with most dual process 
theories that the automatic system is non-conscious, can operate in parallel with 
other processes, and is relatively undemanding of cognitive resources, there are
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some remarkable differences. Unconscious thought theory actually assumes 
‘sm art’ unconscious processes. They are not always fast, but sometimes take 
time, or ‘sleeping on it’. Intuition is often assumed to be about immediate 
decisions, or snap judgments. Although unconscious thought theory does not 
state that snap judgments do not work, sometimes decisions require some 
mauling over. Weighting attributes for instance takes some time and indeed, 
research shows th a t unconscious thought aids the weighting process 
(Dijksterhuis, Bos, & Van Baaren, 2010). Unconscious thought theory also differs 
from some dual process theories in that it states that thorough conscious thought 
does not necessarily lead to less bias. In fact, conscious thought can even lead to 
more bias than unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis & Bos, 2010).
The present dissertation
The present dissertation further investigates the circumstances under 
which we can use unconscious thought to our benefit in decision making. Also, 
we try to give some insight in when to use unconscious thought and when 
conscious thought may even be just as beneficial. Our goal is to assess how we 
can strategically apply unconscious thought to aid in decision making.
In chapter 2 we investigate whether unconscious thought is an active, 
goal-dependent process. Unconscious thought is often manipulated by giving a 
distraction task. The common result is that afterwards performance is increased. 
The question is: Is there an active process going on during the distraction? Or can 
the increase in performance be explained by a ‘fresh look’ after the distraction. 
Do we think unconsciously about everything we see? Or do we need a goal? In 4 
experiments, we presented participants with information. Some participants 
were given a goal to process the information, whereas others were not given such 
a goal. Our results suggest that indeed, unconscious thought is an active process 
(Bos et al., 2008), ensuing only when a goal is given.
In chapter 3 we investigate what happens when a decision becomes 
increasingly complex. We also try to address a series of critiques to the methods 
we have used in previous experiments. In two experiments, participants were 
given a large amount of information regarding decision alternatives and were
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later asked to make a decision. We replicated results from chapter 2, showing 
that unconscious thought is goal-dependent. More interestingly, we found that, 
compared to conscious thought, unconscious thought performs well when 
information is complex, even when conscious thinkers can review all of the 
information. Our results suggest that unconscious thought can indeed handle 
very complex decisions. Results over our various methods converge: Whether 
complexity comes from the amount of information or from having to make 
various simultaneous decisions, unconscious thought outperforms conscious 
thought (Bos, Dijksterhuis, Bongers et al., 2010).
In the experiments in chapter 4 we again present participants with 
information. We find that performance for conscious thinkers declines when they 
are told their decision task will be complex. Unconscious thinkers on the other 
hand show an increase in performance when the same challenge is set before 
them (Bos et al., 2010a), but a decrease when they are told the decision will be 
easy. We explain our results in the light of literature on choking under pressure.
In chapter 5 we investigated the impact of an increase in blood sugar level 
on decision making. Although, as expected, conscious thought performance 
declines when blood sugar level is low, the reverse is true for unconscious 
thought. We hypothesize that there might be a fit between thought mode and 
blood sugar level. When we are high on energy, it just ‘feels’ better to think 
consciously, but when we are low on energy, it ‘feels’ better to think 
unconsciously (Bos et al., 2010b).
Conclusion
Complex decisions we have to face can near paralyze us. Decades of 
basking in glory of the capabilities of consciousness (Descartes, 1664) have made 
us blind for the potential of our unconsciousness (Damasio, 1994; Bargh, 2002). 
Our consciousness is not the apparatus its pistal promises it to be. There are 
many fields where unconscious processes have been given some credit as clever 
processes. This change is less to be found in literature on decision making, where 
consciousness and conscious thought are still overrated in the same way that the 
unconscious and unconscious thought are underrated. Research exploring the
18
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capabilities of our unconscious have shown what tremendous feats can be 
achieved by relying on unconscious processes, and our own research successfully 
takes these findings to the field of decision making.
Applications
Potential benefits from unconscious thought can be found in several 
domains of life and work sectors. As said, decisions pervade daily life, and 
business is no exception. In any area where complex decisions are part of 
everyday life, it may be sound advise to divert attention from the decision and 
use unconscious thought. A few examples are listed below.
Management. Managers face high-stakes business decisions all the time. 
Resources like time and energy are limited, while the amount of information 
requiring analysis has increased. Many managers resort to making snap 
judgments when making a decision (Dane & Pratt, 2007). When you are faced 
with a decision problem within your field of expertise this should not be a 
problem, especially when you are given timely feedback (Kardes, 2006). 
However, this may not always be the right way to go. Especially when facing a 
decision regarding information you are not familiar with, snap judgments may 
lead you astray. Thoroughly encoding the information consciously but then 
letting the unconscious do the work may aid complex business decisions.
Legal Judgment. Few decisions can be as complex as legal decisions. 
Judges face incredible amounts of information, which they are obligated to 
weight to come to fair decisions. Although some research shows that 
unconscious thought is not very good at ignoring irrelevant information (Bos, 
Dijksterhuis, Van der Leij, & Van Baaren, 2010; De Wit, Van den Bos, Ham, & 
Muller, 2010), when relevant information is encoded correctly, it can be very 
helpful to decision making (Ham & Van den Bos, 2009, 2010). A problem with 
using unconscious thought in a legal system is of course accountability. Trusting 
our gut in legal decisions might ‘feel’ wrong. However, with a greater acceptance 
of unconscious thought as a decision making tool, this may become less of a 
problem. Conscious thought could then be seen as a ‘fact checker’, to be used 
after an unconscious decision has been made.
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Life's decisions. Of course, benefits can not only be found for high stake 
decisions like judges and managers have to make. Every single one of us often 
faces complex decisions. In a time which characterizes itself by constant change, 
hastiness and distraction, unconscious thought may be a valuable tool, requiring 
no conscious attention. Unconscious thought allows us to focus our conscious 
attention on other things while our unconscious works out our decisions for us.
Decisions under strain. Having a limited amount of resources produces 
clear detriments for various conscious processes (Donohoe & Benton, 1990). One 
could say that to make sound decisions, elevating blood sugar after every mental 
exercise may solve the problem of our tired consciousness. This paints a rather 
gloomy pictures for those of us who want to be able to make solid decisions 
without stuffing ourselves with high-carbon foods all the time. Luckily, when we 
are low on resources we can rely on unconscious thought to help us make 
decisions.
Generally, we can conclude that unconscious thought is very suitable for 
processing information. It is clever in the way that it can weight information 
(Dijksterhuis & Bos, 2010), it is somewhat dumb in that it blindly processes 
information it is fed, without ignoring information which after encoding turns 
out not to be true (Bos, Dijksterhuis, Van der Leij, & Van Baaren, 2010) or should 
be ignored because it clouds judgment (De Wit et al., 2009).
As in turns out, we are very capable of making complex decisions. When 
making a complex decision, we should consciously attend to all information there 
is to be found about that decision. What we then need is to either consciously 
(Bos et al., 2008; Bos, Dijksterhuis, Bongers et al., 2010) or unconsciously (Bos et 
al. 2010a) activate the goal to process the information, to minimize interference 
from our overestimated and overzealous consciousness (Bos et al. 2010b; Bos, 
Dijksterhuis, Bongers et al., 2010; Igou & Bless, 2007) and lastly, to trust our 
intuitive judgments (Bos et al., 2010a). Like speech production for instance, 
successful decision making is an interplay between various conscious processes 
and unconscious processes. We can make good decisions, all we need to do when 
conscious thought fails us, is start trusting our unconscious.
20
Chapter 2
The goal-dependency of unconscious thought
Based on: Bos, M.W., Dijksterhuis, A., & Van Baaren, R.B. (2008). On the goal- 
dependency of unconscious thought. Journal o f Experimental Social Psychology, 
44, 1114-1120.
Abstract
The benefits of unconscious thought in decision making
Recent research has shown that unconscious thought can improve the 
quality of complex decisions (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & 
Van Baaren, 2006). In the present research, we investigate whether unconscious 
thought is goal-dependent. In four experiments participants were given 
information pertaining to a decision problem or to an impression formation 
problem. Subsequently, they were either given time to think consciously about 
the information or they were distracted for some time, during which they could 
engage in unconscious thought. Of the participants that were distracted, however, 
some were given the goal to further process the information, whereas others 
were not given such a goal. Our experiments clearly show that unconscious 
thought is goal-dependent. Without a goal, people do not engage in unconscious 
thought.
22
Chapter 2 - The goal-dependency of unconscious thought
Anyone who has ever bought a house knows that choosing between 
various complex, multifaceted alternatives can be a daunting task. Common 
wisdom dictates that thorough conscious thought improves the quality of 
people’s decisions for such complex objects, but this is often not the case 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). Conscious thought often leads 
people to use inappropriate heuristics and conscious thinkers can fall prey to 
biases that often harm decisions (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991). In addition, conscious capacity is low, making conscious thought 
more fruitful for relatively simple decisions, but not for complex ones 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).
However, it has been demonstrated recently that a period of unconscious 
thought can improve the quality of people’s decisions (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). Unconscious thought can best be defined as 
thought or reasoning that takes place when conscious attention is directed 
elsewhere. In research in our laboratory, we demonstrated that unconscious 
thought can be highly adaptive. In most of our previous experiments, participants 
were first presented with information pertaining to a decision problem. They 
were later asked questions about this information (usually they were asked to 
choose among alternatives) under three different conditions. Participants either 
decided immediately after being presented with the information, or they decided 
after a period of conscious thought, or they decided after a period of distraction 
during which they engaged in unconscious thought. The common result was that 
unconscious thinkers made better decisions than participants in the other two 
conditions.
In the current work, we want to shed more light on the process of 
unconscious thought. The specific nature of our unconscious thought conditions 
in earlier experiments leaves an im portant question unanswered: Is unconscious 
thought goal-dependent? One possibility is that we always (or at least very often) 
engage in unconscious thought after having encoded information. If this is the 
case, unconscious thought is merely a residual process that follows the encoding 
of information. Another possibility is that unconscious thought only takes place 
when we have the goal to process information. It would mean that, after having
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encoded information, we only engage in further unconscious thought if it is 
important, for instance, because we have to make a decision with the help of this 
information. At face value, one could argue that the first possibility — 
unconscious thought as a residual process following encoding— is rather 
inefficient. After all, we process enormous amounts of information on a daily 
basis, and thinking about all of this would become a daunting enterprise, even for 
the unconscious with its high capacity. That being said, the fact that one 
alternative may be somewhat inefficient is not a sufficient reason to decline it.
Our earlier work does not speak to whether unconscious thought is goal- 
dependent. Participants in the unconscious thought conditions were always 
given a goal, or at least an expectation that they would later have to do something 
with the information they had encoded (again, usually to make a decision). For 
instance, after having read about four cars, but immediately before they were 
distracted, participants were told that they would have to answer questions 
about the cars later (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) or after having been presented 
with information about apartments participants were told that they would later 
have to choose among them (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Hence, we know unconscious 
thought takes place when people have a goal that involves further processing of 
the information, but what happens without such a goal?
The question w hether unconscious thought is goal-dependent is 
im portant from a theoretical perspective, because it helps us to better 
understand the process of unconscious thought. An alternative explanation for 
unconscious thought effects is the process of set-shifting (see e.g., Schooler & 
Melcher, 1995, for an elaboration in the domain of creativity). That is, one could 
assume that the beneficial effects of a period of distraction from a decision 
problem do not result from an active unconscious thought process, but merely 
from the disruption of non-productive conscious thought. For instance, people 
often approach a problem with wrong cues, wrong heuristics and /or wrong 
information. Following a period of distraction, such wrong approaches become 
less accessible or are forgotten altogether. The effects of distraction on a change 
of mental set can be both very pronounced (such as when one tries to solve a 
chess problem and initially gets truly “fixed” in thinking along a wrong path) or
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more subtle (such as when distraction attenuates the biasing influence of 
primacy or recency effects). Such processes are often categorized under the 
umbrella of the "fresh-look” explanation: Putting a problem aside for a while 
allows for a fresh, unbiased new start.
However, we maintain (see Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) that unconscious thought is an active process. 
During a period of distraction, unconscious thought leads to a different (i.e., 
better) organization of information in memory and to a more clear, polarized 
evaluation of different decision alternatives. The present research helps us to 
distinguish between active, unconscious thought, as we propose, and the “fresh- 
look” alternative whereby people merely benefit from distraction because it 
interrupts conscious thought. After all, an explanation in terms of set-shifting 
would predict that unconscious thought effects are independent of goals and that 
only a period of distraction is necessary for unconscious thought effects to occur.
One may be skeptical about the possibility of unconscious thought being 
goal-dependent, because goal pursuit has long been associated with the need of 
conscious guidance (Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
Gollwitzer, 1990; Locke & Latham, 1990; summaries in Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 
1996; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001). However, 
the current state of affairs in the literature on goal-pursuit allows for the 
possibility of unconscious thought being goal-dependent. In previous 
experiments conducted in our laboratory, participants in the unconscious 
thought conditions were told that they would later have to use the information 
again, for instance, to make a decision. This implies that, goal setting (making a 
decision) was conscious. However, if indeed unconscious thought is goal- 
dependent, it follows that in our experiments goal-monitoring was unconscious. 
That is, control of the progress towards reaching the goal, which accompanies 
goal pursuit, was done during unconscious thought. Recent research 
demonstrates that this is possible indeed. We know that not only can goals be set 
unconsciously (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 
1999), but also that they can be monitored unconsciously (Bongers & 
Dijksterhuis, 2009; Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004), In fact, goals can even run to
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completion without any conscious guidance (Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & 
Troetschel, 2001; Custers & Aarts, 2005).
Overview of the experiments
To test whether unconscious thought is goal-dependent, we conducted 
four experiments. In Experiments 1a and b, participants were given information 
about four cars. One of the four cars was made more attractive than the others, 
whereas one was made less attractive than the others. In Experiment 1a, 
participants later judged the cars and the difference between the attitudes 
towards the two cars was taken as a measure for how well participants could 
distinguish between the good and the bad car (as in Dijksterhuis, 2004; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). In Experiment 1b, participants were asked to recall as 
many aspects of the cars as possible. Before the dependent variables were 
administered in Experiments 1a and b, participants were divided into three 
conditions. Participants were either probed after a period of conscious thought, 
or after a period of distraction that started with the instruction they would have 
to answer questions about the information (the unconscious thought condition 
in our previous work). In a third, new condition, participants were distracted 
after they had been told that the task about the about the cars was over and 
hence, that they would not have to answer any questions about the cars anymore 
(from now on, the "mere distraction condition”).
In Experiment 2, participants were given behavioral information about a 
target person. They were asked to write down as much as they could remember 
about the target person, either after mere distraction or after a period of 
unconscious thought. The amount of clustering of the behavioral information, 
indicating the organization of the information in memory, was measured (as in 
Dijksterhuis, 2004).
In Experiment 3, participants were given information about two different 
decision problems, namely cars and roommates. They were then given the goal to 
either unconsciously think about the cars or about the roommates. After a period 
of unconscious thought, they were asked to rate both the cars and the roommates
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on attractiveness. With this experiment we explored to what extent more specific 
goals can affect unconscious thought. Can we strategically think unconsciously 
about one thing but not the other, even if the information was encoded at the 
same time?
Experiment 1a: Method
Participants and design
Participants were undergraduate students recruited at the University of 
Amsterdam. Of the 47 participants, 18 were male. The average age was 20.7 (SD 
= 2.89). Participants either received course credits or money (seven euros) for 
their participation. The participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a 
conscious thought condition, an unconscious thought condition, or a mere 
distraction condition.
Procedure and materials
The experim ent was conducted in a series of many unrelated 
experiments. All the experiments were conducted on a computer. Participants 
were told they would receive information about four cars, named the Dasuka, the 
Nabusi, the Kaiwa and the Hatsdun. They were asked to pay close attention to the 
information. The paradigm was the same as the one used by Dijksterhuis et al. 
(2006). Each of the four cars was described with 12 attributes (for instance, the 
Dasuka is brand new, the Nabusi has good mileage, etc.). One of the cars was the 
best car, with eight positive attributes and four negative attributes, one car was 
the worst, with four positive attributes and eight negative attributes and the 
other cars were intermediate, with both six positive and six negative attributes. 
As not all attributes were equally important, we made sure that the best car 
excelled on the most im portant aspects whereas the worst car excelled primarily 
on unim portant attributes. The 48 pieces of information were presented to the 
participants on a computer screen. Each piece was presented for 4 s, with a 0.5 s 
interval between.
After the presentation of the information participants were assigned to 
one of the three conditions. The participants in the conscious thought condition
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were asked to think about their impression of the cars for 4 minutes. The 
participants in the mere distraction condition were shown a standard screen, 
used many times previously in experiments in the same research laboratory, 
indicating that the experiment was now over and that they would continue to do 
another task. They then received a distraction task in which they were asked to 
solve a word search puzzle. In the word search puzzle, we used only neutral, 
mundane words (e.g., ‘chair’ or ‘table’). The participants in the unconscious 
thought condition were told that they would have to perform another task, but 
that after this task they would be asked about their opinion about the cars, 
thereby giving them the goal to process the information during the distraction 
task they received. Their distraction task was the same as in the mere distraction 
condition.
Afterwards, all participants were given 20-point attitude scales, asking 
them their opinion about the cars (e.g., “to what extent did you think the Nabusi 
was a good car?”, ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’).
Results
Participants’ performance was assessed by subtracting their attitude 
score for the w orst car from their attitude score for the best car. This created an 
attitude difference score indicating to what extent participants were able to 
differentiate between the best and the w orst car (taken from Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006; see also Dijksterhuis, 2004).
The difference scores were compared in an analysis of variance. A main 
effect of condition was found, F(2, 44) = 12.53, p < .01, = 0.36. The attitude
difference score for the participants in the unconscious thought condition (M =
7.00, SD = 4.04) differed significantly from the attitude difference score for the 
participants in the conscious thought condition (M = 1.26, SD = 3.49), F(1, 32) = 
19.71, p < .01, r\p = 0.38, and from the attitude difference score for the
participants in the mere distraction condition (M = 0.54, SD = 4.29), F(1, 26) = 
16.83, p < .01, r\2p = 0.39. These latter two scores did not differ significantly (F <
1).
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Experiment 1b
The instruction in the mere distraction condition, where the participants 
were led to believe they would continue with a different experiment, allows for a 
different explanation of the findings of Experiment 1a. The results could 
potentially be explained by a “directed forgetting effect” as described by 
MacLeod (1998). Work on directed forgetting shows that giving participants an 
instruction to forget results in poorer memory of information compared to when 
participants are given an instruction to remember. The instruction our 
participants in the mere distraction were given, could be conceived of as similar 
to an instruction to forget. It is possible that the difference in attitude between 
the unconscious thought and the mere distraction condition was caused not by 
actual unconscious thought in the appropriate condition, but by differential 
memory. Perhaps participants in both conditions simply judged on the basis of 
what they could recall after the distraction task, whereby participants in the 
mere distraction condition underperformed because they had forgotten the 
relevant information. As this is an alternative explanation worth exploring 1, we 
conducted Experiment 1b. The experiment is exactly the same as Experiment 1a, 
but instead of their attitudes towards the cars, participants were now asked to 
write down as much as they could remember about each car.
Method
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students recruited at the University of 
Nijmegen. Of the 126 participants, 35 were male. The average age was 21.6 (SD = 
3.79). Participants either received course credits or money (eight euros) for their 
participation.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 1b was almost identical to the procedure 
for Experiment 1a, but instead of their attitude towards the cars, participants
1 I would like to thank Jonathan Schooler for suggesting Experiment 1b.
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were now instructed to write down as much as they could remember about the 
cars. They were given 3 minutes for this task.
Results
As each of the four cars had been described with both positive and 
negative information, we analyzed the recall data according to a 3 (condition: 
conscious thought versus unconscious thought versus mere distraction) x 4 (Car 
A to D) x 2 (valence: positive versus negative information) with the last two 
factors within-participants. Our analyses of variance confirmed that participants 
did not differ in their total recall of information, not in the recall of positive 
information or recall of negative information, not with respect to recall errors 
and not with respect to recall of any one of the cars (all Fs < 1).
Discussion
Experiment 1a clearly showed that participants in the conscious thought 
condition were outperformed by participants in the unconscious thought 
condition in their ability to distinguish between the best car and the w orst car. 
With this effect, we replicated our earlier work. More importantly, participants in 
the unconscious thought condition also outperformed the participants in the 
mere distraction condition demonstrating that unconscious thought is goal- 
dependent and at the same time refuting a set-shifting or “fresh-look” alternative 
explanation. Experiment 1b showed that the findings in Experiment 1a cannot be 
explained by directed forgetting occurring in the mere distraction condition. In 
sum, in combination the findings of Experiments 1a and b provide strong 
support for the hypothesis that unconscious thought is goal-dependent.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we used a different paradigm to test the goal- 
dependency of unconscious thought. The paradigm was taken from Dijksterhuis 
(2004, Experiment 5). In that experiment, participants received information 
about a person, Jeroen, with the instruction to form an impression of him. Jeroen 
was described by 18 behaviors and these behaviors were all descriptive of one of 
three personality traits. Later recall data showed that participants who had
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thought about Jeroen unconsciously had clustered the information in memory 
around these three traits. Participants who had thought about Jeroen consciously 
or who had not thought about Jeroen at all did not show this organization of the 
information in memory. In the present experiment, we try to replicate this 
experiment with, in addition to an unconscious thought condition, a mere 
distraction condition.
In Experiment 2, we decided not to include a conscious thought condition. 
In Experiments 1a and b we included such a condition to be able to replicate the 
effects we found in our earlier work (i.e., that unconscious thought leads to 
better decisions than conscious thought), but a conscious thought condition is 
not necessary for the hypothesis under consideration.
In Experiments 1a and b, participants in the mere distraction condition 
were given information about the four cars and were then told that the 
experiment was over. Although we refuted an alternative explanation in terms of 
differential recall in Experiment 1b, it could still be the case that the instruction 
given in Experiments 1a and b comes across as odd for participants, as they 
receive information they are then asked not to do anything with. For this reason, 
in Experiment 2 we used a slightly different procedure.
Method
Participants and design
Forty native Dutch undergraduate students were recruited at the 
University of Amsterdam. Of the 40 participants with an average age of 21.2 (SD 
= 3.49), seven were male. Participants either received course credits or money 
(seven euros) for their participation. The participants were assigned to one of 
two conditions: an unconscious thought condition and a mere distraction 
condition.
Procedure and materials
Participants were told they would be presented with information about a 
person named “Jeroen”. Subsequently, 18 short sentences were presented one by 
one on a computer screen in random order. A sentence stayed on the screen for 5
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s, with the next sentence appearing after a pause of half a second. All sentences 
were pre-tested to load on one of three trait categories. Six of the sentences 
indicated intelligence, six others were indicative of Jeroen being athletic and the 
remaining six were indicative of Jeroen being politically left-wing.
As said, in Experiments 1a and b we told participants in the mere 
distraction condition that the experiment was over immediately after they had 
encoded the information. Some participants may have found this hard to believe. 
We deemed such information to be more plausible after giving participants the 
feeling that they had at least done something with the information they had just 
read. Therefore, participants were asked how sympathetic they thought Jeroen 
was immediately after they had read the information about Jeroen. They could 
indicate their answer on a 9-point scale.
Subsequently, participants were assigned to the conditions. In the mere 
distraction condition, participants were told the experiment was over and that 
they would now continue with another task. In the unconscious thought 
condition, participants were told they would continue with another task, but that 
they would be asked a couple of questions about Jeroen afterwards. The 
distraction task consisted of anagrams. After the distraction task, participants 
were given 4 minutes to write down as much as they could remember about 
Jeroen.
Results and discussion
In order to compare the amount of clustering in memory of the 
information, a clustering score was computed per participant. We did this by 
calculating conditional probabilities in the free recall protocol (see Dijksterhuis, 
2004; Hamilton, Driscoll, & Worth, 1989; and Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,
1996). The number of same-trait sequences (e.g., an intelligent behavior recalled 
after another intelligent behavior) was divided by the total number of behaviors 
recalled minus one. Higher clustering scores represent more integration and 
organization in memory of the information. Indeed, the clustering scores were 
higher in the unconscious thought condition (M = 0.45, SD = 0.156) than in the 
mere distraction condition (M = 0.28, SD = 0.154), t(1, 38) = 3.45, p < .01, r]* =
32
Chapter 2 - The goal-dependency of unconscious thought
0.24. Participants who were given the goal to think unconsciously show greater 
organization and integration than participants in the mere distraction condition.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we go one step further. Now that it is demonstrated that 
unconscious thought is goal-dependent, is it possible that unconscious thought is 
sensitive to more specific goals? In Experiments 1 and 2, the activated goal was 
very general in the sense that participants knew they would be probed about the 
information they had just read. But what if they know they will only be probed 
about some of the information, but not all?
In Experiment 3, we present participants with information about two 
decision problems: One about cars, and one about roommates. Later, some 
participants are given the goal to reach a decision about the cars, whereas other 
are given the goal to decide between the roommates. After a period of 
unconscious thought, all participants are asked about the cars and about the 
roommates. The question is whether someone who has the goal to decide 
between cars but not roommates will indeed make a better decision about the 
cars than about the roommates, and vice versa.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred thirty eight undergraduate students from the University of 
Amsterdam participated in the Experiment. Of the 138 participants, with an 
average age of 21 (SD = 2.65), 52 were male. They received either course credits 
or money (seven euros) for their participation. They were assigned to one of two 
conditions: an unconscious thought condition where they were given the goal to 
think unconsciously about cars or an unconscious thought condition where they 
were given the goal to think unconsciously about roommates.
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Procedure and materials
In Experiment 3, participants received information about three cars and 
three roommates. Each car and each roommate was described by 10 aspects. One 
of the cars was the best car, with eight positive and two negative aspects. Another 
car was the w orst of the three with two positive and eight negative aspects. The 
third car had both five positive and five negative aspects. The roommate 
materials were constructed the same way: one roommate had eight positive and 
two negative aspects, one had two positive and eight negative aspects and the 
third roommate had both five positive and five negative aspects.
In total, participants received 60 pieces of information. The information 
was shown in random order, whereby all information appeared on the screen for 
4 s. After the presentation of the information, participants were then either told 
they would later be asked questions about the cars or they were told they would 
later be asked questions about the roommates. They were then given an n-back 
task for distraction. In the n-back task, participants see numbers on the 
computer screen for 1 s, with half a second between the numbers. If the number 
they see is the same number as the number n places before, they are supposed to 
press the spacebar. In the present experiment a 2-back task was used. The 2-back 
task is not very difficult to perform, but does require a lot of conscious attention, 
thereby disabling conscious thought about any other information (Jonides et al., 
1997).
Afterwards, all participants were given 20-point attitude scales, asking 
them to rate the cars and the roommates (e.g., “to what extent did you think 
Roommate 1 was a good roommate?”, ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’).
Results and discussion
To assess how well participants were able to distinguish between the best 
and the w orst alternative for both the cars and the roommates, attitude 
difference scores were created by subtracting the attitude score for the w orst car 
from the attitude score for the best car and by subtracting the attitude score for 
the w orst roommate from the attitude score for the best roommate. To test the 
hypothesis that giving participants the goal to think about one topic and not the
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other leads to differential unconscious thought, we compared the difference 
scores between conditions using a 2 (condition: goal to think about cars versus 
goal to think about roommates) x 2 (difference score: cars versus roommates) 
analysis of variance.
The predicted interaction was significant, F(1, 136) = 4.12, p < .05, r\2 = .
03. Participants were better able to distinguish between the best and the worst 
alternative for the materials they were asked to think about than for the 
materials they were not asked to think about. Indeed, the effect of condition on 
the difference score for the roommates was significant, F(1, 136) = 4.64, p < .05, 
v\2 = .03. Participants who were given the goal to think unconsciously about the
roommates showed a higher difference score for the roommates (M = 7.94, SD = 
4.87) than participants who were given the goal to think unconsciously about the 
cars (M = 5.97, SD = 5.87). Participants who were given the goal to think 
unconsciously about the cars did not show a significantly higher difference score 
for the cars (M = 3.00, SD = 5.91) than participants who where given a goal to 
think about the roommates (M = 2.81, SD = 6.39), F(1, 136) < 1, ns. Still, the 
significant two-way interaction allows for the conclusion that unconscious 
thought is not just goal-dependent, but also capable of obeying goals that are 
quite specific.
We also obtained a main effect of materials, F(1, 136) = 57,71, p < .01, r\2p
= .30. Participants were better able to distinguish the quality of the roommates 
than to distinguish the quality of the cars. This effect, unim portant for our 
hypothesis, may have been caused by the fact that the attractive and the 
unattractive roommates indeed differed more than the attractive and the 
unattractive cars. Another reason may be that the information that was 
presented about the cars was less interesting for participants than the 
information that was presented about the potential roommates.
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General discussion
The results of the four experiments demonstrated that unconscious 
thought is a goal-dependent process. Without the goal to process the information 
for a later purpose, unconscious thought does not occur. Giving participants the 
goal to think unconsciously prior to a distraction task improved their 
performance on attitude formation (Experiment 1a) and on information 
integration (Experiment 2). Furthermore, giving participants a specific goal to 
think about some information and not others was obeyed by unconscious 
thought (Experiment 3).
Our findings have various implications. Theoretically, the findings are 
im portant as they support the idea that unconscious thought is an active thought 
process. The alternative idea, that participants in our work simply benefit from 
set-shifting (or, a “fresh-look”) because of a period of distraction is refuted by the 
current data. Participants in our mere distraction conditions could just as well 
have engaged in set-shifting, but they did not benefit from it. They consistently 
underperformed relative to participants in the unconscious thought conditions.
The current findings are also relevant from a practical perspective, 
because they show that unconscious thought can be applied strategically. We can 
benefit from the powerful and high capacity unconscious thought at will, by 
actively deciding to delegate thinking to the unconscious. The question is to what 
extent we can do this. How flexible is unconscious thought? Our last experiment 
suggests a remarkable degree of flexibility in that people can decide to 
unconsciously think about some things and not others.
Other questions remain though. What if one processes information about 
a number of houses, and only then hears that the objective is to choose a house 
for one’s grandmother who cannot negotiate stairs anymore? This requires a 
certain degree of goal-flexibility. And what about goal strength? Is unconscious 
thought more effective for things that are extremely im portant than for things 
that are moderately important? Finally, and this is im portant with respect to 
ecological validity: how and when do we implement the goal to unconsciously 
think in real life, that is, when there are no convenient instructions provided by
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experimenters? The bottom-line is that the current findings open up a host of 
new questions related to the potential flexibility and sophistication of 
unconscious thought.
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Complexity and unconscious thought
Based on: Bos, M.W., Dijksterhuis, A., Bongers, K.C.A., Van der Leij, A.R., 
Sjoerdsma, A., & van Baaren, R.B. (2010). Unconscious thought with difficult and 
ecologically valid decision problems. Manuscript submitted for publication.
The benefits of unconscious thought in decision making
Abstract
Various experiments have shown that decisions made after a period of 
unconscious thought are sometimes better than decisions made after conscious 
deliberation. Unconscious thought is especially helpful when the decision 
problem is complex (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). In the 
present article, unconscious thought was studied under difficult decision 
circumstances that were more ecologically valid than in earlier experiments. In 
the first experiment, participants chose between six houses based on the actual 
information of a real estate website. In the second experiment, participants made 
five choices at the same time. In both experiments it was shown that unconscious 
thinkers made better decisions than conscious thinkers and than immediate 
decision makers.
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Unconscious Thought
We are faced with many complex decisions. When contemplating to buy a 
house, for instance, common wisdom dictates to weight all aspects of the 
decision consciously in order to come to a balanced decision. As our mental 
resources and attention are limited (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kahneman, 1973), 
the question arises whether complex decisions are indeed best made after 
conscious deliberation. Recent research suggests they are not (Dijksterhuis, Bos, 
Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006).
In a typical unconscious thought experiment, participants are first 
presented with information pertaining to a decision problem. Later, they are 
asked questions about this information (usually they are asked to choose among 
alternatives) under three different conditions. Participants either decide 
immediately after being presented with the information, or they decided after a 
period of conscious thought, or they decided after a period of distraction during 
which they engaged in unconscious thought. The common result is that 
unconscious thinkers made the best decisions (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & Van Baaren, 
2008; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Van der Leij, & Van Baaren, 2009; Ham & Van den Bos, 
2010a; Ham, Van den Bos, & Van Doorn, 2009; Lerouge, 2009; Pochwatko, 
Sweklej, Balas, & Godlewska, 2008; Smith, Dijksterhuis, & Wigboldus, 2008; 
Wilbur, Caron, & Campbell, 2008).
The above research notwithstanding, many experts on decision making 
would argue that, when facing a complex decision, one would do well to 
consciously attend to all aspects of the decision and to consciously weight all 
relevant aspects thoroughly (see e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977). In order to reconcile 
this idea with the results on unconscious thought, the decision paradigm used to 
assess effects of unconscious thought has been criticized. In addition, some 
researchers failed to replicate the unconscious thought effect and found that 
conscious thinkers and unconscious thinkers perform equally well (Gonzalez- 
Vallejo, Lassiter, Belezza, & Lindberg, 2008; Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 
2008; Lassiter, Lindberg, Gonzalez-Vallejo, Belleza, & Phillips, 2009), suggesting 
that there are moderators that have yet to be identified.
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A key question is to what extent the unconscious thought effect is 
generalizable to other paradigms or situations (see also Bekker, 2006). The effect 
has been found for several different choices, including hypothetical houses and 
cars, posters that people could take home (whereby quality of choice was 
operationalized as post-choice satisfaction), for predictions of sport games 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2009), and for justice and moral judgments (Ham & van den 
Bos, 2010a; 2010b).
That being said, the procedure that is used most often has some 
limitations. The decisions are often much less complex than actual decisions in 
real life. In addition, some aspects of the procedure in earlier experiments are 
suboptimal with regards to ecological validity. First, conscious thinkers were not 
allowed to view the information while they engaged in conscious thought. This 
does not reflect real-life decision making and it may also have posed memory 
overload on participants (Shanks, 2006). Second, conscious thinkers were asked 
to think for a fixed amount of time. This may have led people to think longer than 
they would normally do (Payne et al., 2008). Thirdly, in many experiments, the 
attributes of the choice alternatives were presented in random order, rather than 
grouped by choice alternative (Gonzalez-Vallejo et al., 2008). A recent m eta­
analysis indeed shows that when the attributes are grouped by choice alternative 
unconscious thought leads to better results compared to when attributes were 
presented in random order (Strick, Dijksterhuis, Bos, Sjoerdsma, Van Baaren, & 
Nordgren, 2010). Finally, unconscious thinkers were generally given only a 
limited amount of time to engage in unconscious thought.
In addition, in daily life we are sometimes not just faced with one decision, 
it is far more likely that we are facing several simultaneous decisions. While 
reading this paper you may be contemplating which journal to submit your new 
work to, whether to call a friend tonight, and what to eat tonight. Unconscious 
thought has never been investigated under circumstances where participants 
had to make multiple decision at once.
In the present studies, we investigated unconscious thought in more 
demanding, and more ecologically valid, circumstances. In the first experiment, 
participants were given information about six houses that were on sale with the
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instruction to choose. The houses were real houses that were on sale in 
Nijmegen, and the information was taken from a real estate website. We 
addressed the limitations addressed above (except for the problem that people 
sometimes face multiple decisions at once). We presented the information per 
choice alternative, we added a conscious thought condition where participants 
could review all information and we allowed conscious thinkers to think as long 
or short as they liked . Our paradigm alterations aimed at creating a more 
ecologically valid decision problem.
In the second experiment, participants were not just given one decision 
problem, but five simultaneous decisions to process.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, participants read information about six houses that were 
on sale in Nijmegen. The information they received was taken from a real estate 
website and presented by choice alternative, as on the actual website, except that 
the asking prices of the houses were removed, as estimates of these prices 
constituted our dependent variable. We ran four conditions. Some participants 
made their estimates immediately, others were given as much time as they 
wanted to consciously think. A third group could think consciously too, but were 
also given access to the information about the houses while they thought. The 
last group thought unconsciously for approximately 45 to 50 minutes.
Method
Participants
Of the 170 undergraduate students from the Radboud University 
Nijmegen who participated, with an average age of 21.1 (SD = 3.20), 32 were 
male. They either received course credits or 8 Euros.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were seated in individual cubicles in front of a computer. A 
computer program provided the instructions. Participants were asked to 
carefully read information about six houses that were on sale in Nijmegen. The 
inform ation  was taken  from the b iggest Dutch real esta te  w ebsite
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(www.funda.nl) and presented as on the actual website, with one im portant 
exception: The asking prices of the houses were removed. The opening screen for 
each house contained a small photograph, the address, and a general description 
of the house (see Figure 2.1). On the left side of the screen, options were given to 
select other information: A list with features and numerical information (e.g., 
size); a set of additional photographs (about 15 per house); and a map of the 
neighborhood. Participants could freely move back and forth between the 
different screens, and they were given 90 seconds to view the information of 
each individual house. Participants could see how much time they had left before 
they would be presented with the information of the next house.
Paulus Potterstraat 24
6523 CR Nijmegen
Verkopende makelaar: Kolmeijer Makelaars Nijmegen
Description
In een kindvriendelijke straat, in het geliefde Nijmegen-Oost gelegen charmant vrijstaand woonhuis op een voor 
Nijmegen-Oost begrippen uitzonderlijk royaal perceel (480 m2). Tevens is er een vrijstaande, goed gei'soleerde 
praktijkruimte van ca. 22 m2 met een wachtruimte, spreekkamer en een toiletruimte.
Kelder: provisiekelder op stahoogte met de witgoedaansluitingen;
Begane grond: entree met toegang tot de kelderruimte, toiletruimte, sfeervolle lichte woonkamer en suite met originele 
en suite deuren, erker, gashaard, eikenhouten vloer en met openslaande deuren naar het zonneterras en de uiterst diepe 
achtertuin (ca. 31 meter diep!) met een achterom, vrijstaande stenen praktijkruimte en een royale vrijstaande stenen 
schuur/berging; moderne dichte woonkeuken met diverse inbouwapparatuur en met toegang tot de zijtuin;
1e Verdieping: overloop, toiletruimte, 3 slaapkamers waarvan 2 met een inbouwkast, nette badkamer met een 
wastafelmeubel en een doucheruimte, steektrap naar;
Zolder: ruime zolderruimte met bergingsmogelijkheden en de stookruimte. Op deze verdieping is het mogelijk om het 
totaal aantal slaapkamers uit te breiden naar 5.
Voorts: bouwjaar 1928, inhoud ca. 350 m3, perceeloppervlakte 480 m2, c.v.-combiketel (Mefit 2003), gedeeltelijk 
dubbelglas en dakisolatie.
Figure 2.1. A screenshot of how the information about the houses was presented. We translated 
the important information in English for this publication. Our participants read everything in 
Dutch.
We selected the houses with the goal to obtain a set with gradual 
differences in value. The asking prices for the six houses were, in Euros, 559,000,
520,000, 470,000, 449,500, 399,000 and 369,000. Asking prices are generally 
realistic in the Netherlands and houses are usually sold for a price close to the 
asking price.
After participants read the information about the six houses, they were 
told we were interested in how well they could distinguish between the value of
84
Description
Features
Pictures
Neighborhood
House 1
P o m a i n i n n  t i m o  in c o r n n H c
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the houses and that their task was to estimate the prices of the houses. In order 
to motivate participants to do their best, they were told that the five participants 
with the most accurate estimates would receive a monetary reward of 50 Euros. 
Subsequently, we randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions. 
Participants were either asked to make their estimates immediately, or after 
conscious thought where participants were allowed to think as long as they 
wanted (on average, participants took 44 seconds), or after conscious thought 
where participants were allowed to think as long as they wanted but could also 
reread all the presented information in any order they wished (participants took 
on average 5 minutes and 8 seconds, but variance was considerable, ranging 
from 8 seconds to 42 minutes), or after an unconscious thought condition. In this 
last condition participants were told they would make their estimates later and 
then first participated in various other, unrelated experiments before, at the end 
of the experimental session -  about 45 to 50 minutes later -  they made their 
estimates.
Dependent variables
Participants were first presented with the six houses simultaneously and 
asked to choose their favorite. After that, each house was presented individually 
and participants estimated the asking price of each. As we were interested in 
how well participants could distinguish between the most valuable and the least 
valuable house, the difference in estimate of these two houses constituted our 
main dependent variable.
Results and Discussion
Five participants were omitted because their estimates were so high 
(more than 2 million Euros per house) that they would have a disproportionate 
effect on cell means.
We analyzed the difference in estimated price between the most valuable 
and the least valuable house. The actual difference was 190,000 Euros and as can 
be seen in Figure 2.2, the only participants who approached this actual price 
difference were the unconscious thinkers, who indeed performed significantly
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better than participants in the remaining conditions, F(3,261)= 3.41, p = .018, n 2 
= .04 2.
The percentage of participants who chose the most valuable house as 
their favorite were 20.2 % for immediate decision makers, 26.7 % for conscious 
thinkers, 25.0 % for conscious thinkers with information, and 34.5 % for 
unconscious thinkers. The two extremes differed significantly, x 2 = 4.66, p = .031, 
n2 = .03.
200000
100000
0
Actual imm con con w ith info unc
Figure 2.2. Difference in estimates between most and least valuable house. Simple effects 
showed that unconscious thinkers differed significantly from all other individual conditions.
The results of this first experiment show that we find unconscious 
thought effects also under more ecologically valid circumstances. One major 
addition in our experiment was the conscious thought condition where our 
participants could review all the information. Interestingly, performance was no 
different in this condition than in the conscious thought condition without the 
possibility to review the information. It seems therefore that even adding further 
tools for our conscious thought participants did not help them to make better 
decisions.
2 For participants in the conscious thought with information condition, the 
correlation between time spent thinking and estimated difference between most 
valuable and least valuable house was .29 (p < .07)
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Experiment 2
Complexity often does not originate from a single decision alone, but also 
from the fact that we decide about multiple things at the same time. In real life, 
we are usually not just faced with one decision, as participants in our lab usually 
are, instead we often face various -  im portant as well as mundane- decisions. 
One way to test unconscious thought in a more ecological setting is therefore to 
present our participants with simultaneous decisions.
In Experiment 2, participants were given 5 simultaneous decisions to deal 
with. For every decision, there were two choice options of which one was 
normatively the best choice. Participants were later asked to choose and to rate 
the choice options. We ran four thought conditions. Some participants decided 
immediately after presentation of the information, some decided after 4 minutes 
of conscious thought, some decided after 4 minutes of distraction without a goal 
to think about the information they were presented with, a mere distraction 
condition, and some decided after 4 minutes of distraction with the goal to think 
about the information they had been presented with, the unconscious thought 
condition. We included a mere distraction condition to try to replicate earlier 
findings (Bos et al., 2008), showing that a goal is needed for unconscious thought 
to engage.
Method
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students from the Radboud University 
Nijmegen. Of the 87 participants, with an average age of 21 (SD = 3.36), 19 were 
male. They received either course credits or money (8 Euros) for their 
participation.
Materials and Procedure
Upon coming into the lab, participants were seated in front of a computer 
in separate cubicles. A computer program provided instructions. Participants 
received information in random order about 5 subjects, 2 choice options per 
subject, and 5 aspects per choice option. The information was about 2 cars, 2
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apartments, 2 digital cameras, 2 roommates and 2 mobile phones, each described 
by 5 pieces of information. All materials were constructed in exactly the same 
way. The normatively best option was described by 3 positive and 2 negative 
aspects and the other option was described by 2 positive and 3 negative aspects. 
Some participants were asked to give their opinion about the subjects 
immediately, some were given 4 minutes to consciously think about a decision, 
some were merely distracted for 4 minutes without the goal to reach a decision 
and the last group of people were distracted but were told they would later have 
to make a decision and engaged in unconscious thought. The distraction 
consisted of an n-back task, which occupies conscious attention (Jonides et al.,
1997).
Dependent variable
Each choice option was presented individually and participants gave their 
opinion of the choice option on a 20-points scale (ranging from 1: not good to 20: 
very good). They were then asked to make a choice between the two choice 
options for each subject.
Results and Discussion
Participants’ performance on the attitude measure was assessed by 
subtracting their attitude score for the worst choice option from their attitude 
score for the best choice option (taken from Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), for all five 
choices. The five difference scores were added to create a total attitude 
performance score (ranging 5 to 100). Participants’ attitudes in the different 
conditions were compared in an analysis of variance. A main effect of condition 
was found, F(3, 86) = 2.78, p = .046, r\2p = .091. Participants in the unconscious
thought condition (M = 13.86, SD = 13.82) outperformed participants in the 
conscious thought condition (M = 5.57, SD = 11.29), participants in the 
immediate condition (M = 5.95, SD = 7.49) and participants in the mere 
distraction condition (M = 6.88, SD = 9.08). None of the conditions differed from 
any of the other conditions (all Fs < 1) except for the unconscious thought 
condition, which differed from all other conditions (all ps < .05).
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A choice performance score was calculated by counting the correct 
number of choices participants made on the 5 choices. This score ranged from 0 
to 5 for the five choices combined. The choice performance score in the different 
conditions were compared in an analysis of variance. A main effect of condition 
was found, F(3,86) = 2.77, p = .047, r\2p = .091. Participants in the unconscious
thought condition (M = 3.52, SD = 0.750) outperformed participants in the 
conscious thought condition (M = 2.91, SD = 0.900), participants in the 
immediate condition (M = 2.79, SD = 1.13) and participants in the mere 
distraction condition (M = 2.75, SD = 1.15). Again, none of the conditions differed 
from any of the other conditions (all Fs < 1) except for the unconscious thought 
condition, which differed from all other conditions (all ps < .05). Only 
participants in the conscious thought and unconscious thought condition 
performed above chance level, respectively t(23) = 2.20, p = .039 and t(21) = 
6.26, p < .001.
We showed that unconscious thought can process information regarding 
sim ultaneous decisions. We replicated the unconscious thought effect 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) and previous findings regarding the goal-dependency 
of unconscious thought (Bos et al., 2008), showing an increase of performance 
after unconscious thought compared to conscious thought, immediate and mere 
distraction conditions. In particular the comparison to the mere distraction 
condition and immediate condition allows us to interpret that unconscious 
thought is indeed an active, goal-dependent thought process (Bos et al., 2008).
General discussion
In line with Unconscious Thought Theory, we found the unconscious 
thought effect for complex decisions. In Experiment 1, participants made a very 
complex decision whereby decision options were presented per alternative 
instead of with randomized information. In addition, we increased ecological 
validity by allowing participants in the conscious thought condition to think as 
long as they wanted. Even with all information available, conscious thinkers were 
outperformed by unconscious thinkers. In Experiment 2, participants were asked 
to make multiple decisions simultaneously. The findings of Experiment 2 show
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that unconscious thinkers do not merely recall an on-line impression which is 
formed during the presentation of the information, as has been suggested by 
some researchers (Lassiter et al., 2009). Instead their final impression is formed 
during unconscious thought.
Our findings suggest that failures to replicate the unconscious effect 
(Acker, 2008; Newell, Wong, Cheung, & Rakow, 2009) were at least in part caused 
by task simplicity. It is im portant to realize that complexity of a decision problem 
is not determined by amount of attributes alone. The decisions in the current 
experiments were more complex than those in previous experiments because of 
the number of choice alternatives (Experiment 1), the total number of attributes 
(Experiment 1 and 2) and the number of simultaneous decisions (Experiment 2). 
The results how that with such exceedingly complex tasks
However, some questions regarding complexity remain. For instance, at 
what amount of information and level of expertise do we find the turning point 
where meticulous conscious thought leads to better results than unconscious 
thought? It seems evident that this turning point might differ from person to 
person, so what personal characteristics play a role? Such questions w arrant 
future research.
An related question is to what extent people would engage in unconscious 
thought in real-life settings, that is, without being instructed as they are in our 
experiments. Given that conscious thought often leads to poor decisions under 
complex situations, it is very well possible that in general people automatically 
use unconscious thought when faced with complex decisions. Interestingly, it 
may be cultural pressure rather than anything else that disrupts good decision 
making, as (western) culture has dictated the superiority of conscious thought 
for the last couple of decades, whereas more natural, unconscious processing of 
information may lead to the best decisions.
We conclude that, compared to conscious thinkers and immediate 
decision makers, unconscious thinkers were better able to distinguish between 
the best and the w orst decision alternative when procedural limitations for 
conscious thinkers were alleviated (Experiment 1) as well as when handling
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simultaneous decisions (Experiment 2). Furthermore, the unconscious thought 
effect was supported in a more ecologically appealing setting compared to earlier 
research.
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Chapter 4
Based on: Bos, M.W., Dijksterhuis, A., & Van Baaren, R.B. (2010). Unconscious 
thought does not choke under pressure but rises to the challenge. Manuscript 
submitted for publication.
The benefits of unconscious thought in decision making
Abstract
Various cognitive tasks suffer from decreased performance resulting from 
pressure (choking), because conscious attention is devoted to processes that 
operate better at an unconscious level. We tested the prediction that unconscious 
thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren & Van Baaren, 2006) is improved by 
pressure. Participants were given information about cars they had to choose 
from and were told their decision task would either be easy or difficult. After 
either thinking about the information consciously or after being distracted for a 
period of time, participants were asked to rate the cars. In line with earlier work 
(e.g. Baumeister, 1984), conscious thinkers underperformed or “choked” when 
pressured, in that they made poor decisions. Conversely, unconscious thinkers’ 
performance improved under pressure.
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We are faced with many decisions and at times the abundance of available 
choice options can make choosing a daunting task. Ironically, an increase in the 
number of choice options can lead to less rather than more happiness (Schwartz, 
Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, & Lehman, 2002; Iyengar, Wells, & 
Schwartz, 2006). It can, for instance, lead to the experience of choice overload 
(e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2006; Shah & Wolford, 2007) and in some people even 
anxiety (Schwartz et al., 2002). Knowing one has a complex choice ahead may 
lead to experiencing a pressure to perform.
Common knowledge dictates that when we have a complex decision to 
make, we should consciously weight all relevant information and think hard. 
However, research shows that this may be ill-advised, as conscious thought is -  at 
least under some circumstances -sensitive to various pitfalls and biases 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Thinking too much 
consciously about a decision can disrupt a highly automatized and efficient 
decision process. We make decisions all the time, very often without putting too 
much conscious effort in it, and these automatized decisions generally serve us 
well (e.g., Todd, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Intuitive, or unconscious, decision making has a poor reputation probably in part 
because researchers have often focused on when it fails rather than on when it 
succeeds. Although heuristics -  which have traditionally been associated with 
less conscious thought -  may indeed sometimes bias our decisions (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), they are very useful when handling large amounts of 
information (Todd, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). In addition, research shows 
that people who think less before buying a complex product are more satisfied 
with it than people who think more (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 
2006).
The main reason for why consciously thinking about automatized 
processes can have a negative influence on the outcome is that people may ‘choke 
under pressure’ (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock, Kulp, Holt, 
& Carr, 2004; Masters, 1992). It may cause the building blocks of the skill to 
function as separate components, in a way similar to before the skill was 
acquired (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). For example,
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asking someone who can type fast with 10 fingers to concentrate on the letters 
he is writing, will slow the process (which is why typing teachers tell their 
students not to look at their hands while typing). The efficiency of the 
automatized skill is then lost because of the high energy expenditure of the 
separate components. Whereas consciously thinking about a complex decision 
can be a strenuous cognitive task leading to choking, we hypothesize that 
unconscious thought behaves differently under pressure.
Unconscious thought can be defined as a deliberative cognitive process in 
the absence of conscious attention (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). Recently, 
various experiments have shown that unconscious thought can lead to improved 
decisions. In a typical experiment, participants were given information about a 
decision problem. Some participants were asked to consciously think about the 
information, whereas other were given a distraction task and engaged in 
unconscious thought. Again, the common finding is that unconscious thought 
leads to better decisions (Bos, Dijksterhuis, & Van Baaren, 2008; Dijksterhuis, 
2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Van 
der Leij, & Van Baaren, 2009; Ham, van den Bos, & van Doorn, 2009; Lerouge, 
2009).
It is unlikely that unconscious thinkers will choke under pressure as in 
particular conscious attention to automatized skills causes people to choke 
(Markman et al., 2006) and unconscious thought is defined as thought without 
conscious attention (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). In contrast, it may well be 
that unconscious thought is helped by a certain degree of pressure. Research has 
shown that unconscious thought is goal-directed. Bos and colleagues (2008, exp. 
3) demonstrated that when people are faced with two decision problems at the 
same time (choose between three cars and three houses), the goal to focus on 
one decision rather than the other indeed leads unconscious thinkers to making 
a better decision on the decision problem they were asked to think about. Given 
this flexibility of unconscious thought, challenging participants by putting 
pressure on a decision problem may activate a goal to think even harder 
unconsciously, thereby helping decision making. In two experiments we tested 
the prediction that unconscious thought improves when challenged. We added a
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conscious thought condition to the first experiment to investigate whether 
people would indeed choke under pressure.
Experiment 1: Method
Of the 170 undergraduate students from the Radboud University 
Nijmegen with an average age of 20.4 (SD = 1.87) who participated, 22 were 
male. They either received course credits or 10 Euros. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (instruction: “easy” vs. “difficult”) x 2 (thought mode: 
conscious vs. unconscious) between subjects design.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer, in individual cubicles. A 
computer program provided further instructions. All participants received 
information about 10 cars, each described by 8 aspects, which were either 
positive or negative. Two cars were described by 8 positive aspects (for instance: 
“Car 1 is has good handling”), two cars were described by 6 positive aspects, two 
cars were described by 4 positive aspects, two cars were described by 2 positive 
aspects and two cars were described by 0 positive aspects. Each car was 
identifiable by both a number and a color, which were both randomized per 
participant. Participants received additional instructions before information 
about the cars was presented, either telling them it would be easy (“we know 
from previous research that the amount of information you will receive is 
relatively small”), or telling them it would be difficult (“we know from previous 
research that the amount of information you will receive is relatively large”). 
After presentation of information about the cars and the instructions about the 
complexity of the task, participants were randomly assigned to either a conscious 
or an unconscious thought condition. Participants in the conscious thought 
condition were asked to think about the information they were given for four 
minutes. Participants in the unconscious thought condition were told they would 
have to choose a car later and were then given a neutral word search puzzle as a 
distracter task for four minutes (as in Bos et al., 2008). Afterwards, all 
participants were given 20-point attitude scales, asking them their opinion about 
the cars (e.g., “to what extent do you think Car 1 was a good car?”, ranging from 1: 
‘not at all’ to 20: ‘very much so’). Participants were given a 500-point scale,
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asking them to indicate how confident they were about their judgments, to what 
extent they felt they had been able to make a good decision and how complex 
they had found the task to be (all ranging from -250: ‘not at all’ to 250: ‘very 
much so’).
Results
Since the best two cars were of the same quality and the worst two cars 
were of the same quality, we added ratings for the first two cars creating a single 
rating for the best cars and we added ratings for the last two cars creating a 
single rating for the worst cars. We analyzed the ratings for the best and worst 
cars using a repeated-measures analysis of variance with confidence of judgment 
as covariate (ANCOVA).
We realize that our instructions (telling participants their task will be 
complex or easy) could have an impact on the confidence of our participants. It is 
not our goal to investigate confidence, but we do use attitude scales, which may 
be susceptible to this. Preliminary analyses revealed that unconscious thinkers 
(M = -49.7, SD = 118.2) felt they had been better able to make good decisions 
than conscious thinkers (M = -82.44, SD = 112.3), F(1,168) = 3.417, p = .066, r\p
= .020. Therefore, confidence of judgment was entered as a covariate to make 
sure extremity of the ratings were due to participants’ actual ability to 
distinguish the quality of the cars instead of merely their confidence in their 
judgments.
No main effects were found for either instruction or thought mode (Fs < 
1). The analysis showed a significant interaction effect for instruction and 
thought mode. F(4,165) = 6.61, p = .01, r]p = .039. In the conscious thought
condition, participants’ performance was better when told the amount of 
information was small (M = 13.17, SD = 10.10) than when told the amount of 
information was large (M = 10.93, SD = 11.47), F(2,78) = 2.84, p = .096, r\2p = .035
(two-tailed). In the unconscious thought condition on the other hand, 
participants’ performance was slightly better when told the amount of 
information was large (M = 16.74, SD = 11.05) than when told the amount of
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information was small (M = 11.11, SD = 11.30), F(2,86) = 2.89, p = .092, r\2p = .033 
(two-tailed).
For the conscious thought condition, we found a negative correlation 
between performance and perception of task complexity (n = 51, r = -.266, p = . 
059)3. The effect was driven by participants who had been given the ‘difficult’ 
instruction (n = 31, r = -.412, p = .021). Participants in the conscious thought 
condition who had been given the ‘easy’ instruction showed no significant 
negative correlation between perception of task complexity and performance (n 
= 20, r = -.122, p = .609). The significant correlation among participants who had 
been given the ‘difficult’ instruction suggests that (some) participants indeed 
choked. No correlations between perceived task complexity and performance 
were found for participants in the unconscious thought conditions.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we replicated a body of literature showing choking 
effects for conscious processes. Conscious thinkers performed poorly under 
pressure. Unconscious thinkers, on the other hand, showed signs of an 
improvement of performance when challenged. More specifically, the relatively 
poor performance among unconscious thinkers who believed the task to be easy, 
could indicate that unconscious thinkers in this condition put less effort into the 
task. This finding supports previous research showing that unconscious thought 
is goal-directed (Bos et al., 2008). However, given the fact that the difference 
between unconscious thinkers who believed the task to be easy and unconscious 
thinkers who believed the task to be difficult was only marginally significant, we 
deemed it appropriate to try to replicate this effect.
We made one additional change. In Experiment 1, instructions about the 
difficulty of the task were given before encoding of the decision problem related 
information. We know from previous research that unconscious thought works 
better when the relevant information is encoded thoroughly (Lassiter, Lindberg, 
Gonzalez-Vallejo, Belleza, & Phillips, 2009; Lerouge, 2009; Strick, Dijksterhuis,
3 This measure was added later, after data collection had already started, and 
therefore has a smaller n than the full design.
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Bos, Sjoerdsma, Van Baaren, & Nordgren, 2009). Because our instruction could 
have had an effect on the encoding of information (telling participants their task 
would be difficult might make them pay more attention), in Experiment 2 we 
gave our participants similar instructions after encoding of the information, 
either telling them “we know from previous research that the amount of 
information you received is relatively small”, or telling them “we know from 
previous research that the amount of information you received is relatively 
large”. We changed the timing in particular to show that the instruction does not 
affect the encoding so much as that it effects the thought mode. Because we 
replicated the well-documented choking effect for conscious thought in 
Experiment 1, we did not include a conscious thought condition in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
Of the 78 undergraduate students from the Radboud University Nijmegen 
with an average age of 20.6 (SD = 1.83) who participated, 17 were male. They 
either received course credits or 10 Euros. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two instruction-conditions (instruction: “easy” vs. “difficult”).
Procedure
Apart from the timing of the “difficult” versus “easy” instruction and the 
omission of the conscious thought condition, we used the exact same paradigm 
as in Experiment 1.
Results
Again, we analyzed the ratings for the best and worst cars using a 
repeated-measures analysis of variance with confidence of judgment as covariate 
(ANCOVA).
The analysis showed a significant effect for instruction, F(2,75) = 6.68, p 
= .012, rj2p = .082. As in Experiment 1, when told the task was difficult (M = 18.97,
SD = 11.63), participants’ performance was better than when told the task was 
easy (M = 13.65, SD = 12.51).
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Discussion
Our results show that unconscious thought does not choke under 
pressure when having to make a decision about large amounts of information. In 
fact, when a situation calls for it, for instance when we know we have to process 
a large amount of information, unconscious thought rises to the challenge. This 
supports earlier research showing that unconscious thought is a flexible, goal- 
directed process (Bos et al., 2008).
Conversely, participants in the conscious thought condition ‘choked under 
pressure’. It seems as if increased attention to the task backfired, disrupting what 
should have been a fluent and automatic process (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Kimble & 
Perlmuter, 1970). This hypothesis is supported by the finding that conscious 
thinkers felt they were unable to make a good decision and the fact that we found 
a negative correlation between perceived task complexity and performance for 
conscious thinkers who had been told their task would be difficult. Interestingly, 
when conscious thinkers were told the amount of information was easy to 
process, they performed better than when told the amount of information was 
difficult to process.
Combined, our results demonstrate an interesting moderator that can be 
of practical use. Conscious thought is not only a good strategy when decisions are 
objectively easier to make (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006), but also when people think 
the decision is easy to make. When a decision is difficult -  either objectively or 
subjectively -  unconscious thought is the most useful strategy.
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Food for thought?
Strategically applying unconscious thought
Chapter 5
Based on: Bos, M.W., Dijksterhuis, A., & van Baaren, R.B. (2010). Food for thought? 
Trust your unconscious when energy is low. Manuscript submitted for publication.
The benefits of unconscious thought in decision making
Common knowledge dictates that thorough conscious thought leads to 
good and satisfactory decisions. However, conscious thought requires glucose, 
which furnishes energy for the brain. Glucose is sometimes scarce though and 
indeed, conscious thought deteriorates when energy is low (Donohoe & Benton, 
1990). How are we to make good decisions when energy levels are low?
An alternative to conscious thought is unconscious thought. Unconscious 
thought is defined as thought processes which operate in the absence of 
conscious attention directed at the problem at hand (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006) and is reminiscent of lay-people’s idea of ‘sleeping-on-something’. For 
instance, when you have to decide between jobs, you may put the problem aside 
for a while after having taken in the necessary information. After a period of 
unconscious thought, you may experience that one of the options ‘just feels 
better’ than the others. Ironically, research shows that especially complex 
decisions -  traditionally regarded as the domain where conscious deliberation 
excels - benefit from periods of unconscious thought, up to the point where 
unconscious thought can lead to better decisions than conscious thought (Bos, 
Dijksterhuis, & Van Baaren, 2008; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, 
Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006).
Since conscious thought deteriorates when energy is low, whereas 
unconscious thought is presumably not affected by low energy because it does 
not rely on energy consuming conscious processes, would we do well to trust 
unconscious processes when we are low on energy?
What happens to unconscious thought when resources are high is less 
clear. Unconscious thinkers may perform well under such conditions. However, 
some studies have suggested that changing energy levels can disrupt the natural 
flow of unconscious processes (e.g., Holmes, Hayford, Gonzalez, & Weydert, 
1983). This would lead to the prediction that an increase in energy may be 
harmful for unconscious thought.
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Method
Participants and Design
One hundred and fifty seven Dutch undergraduate students were 
randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (Mode of Thought: Conscious versus 
Unconscious) x 2 (Energy-level: Low versus High) between-participants design. 
They received course credits or 7 Euros in return.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were asked not to eat or drink anything 3 hours prior to coming to 
the lab. Self-reports indicated that participants had indeed obeyed this 
instruction. Upon entering the lab, participants in the high energy condition were 
given a drink containing sugar (250 ml of 7-up, containing 28 grams of sugar). 
Participants in the low energy condition were given a drink without sugar (250 
ml of 7-up Free, sweetened with aspartame). The drinks were both pre-tested 
and tested in our experiment and no differences in taste (sweetness) or liking of 
the drinks were reported (all Fs<1).
It takes between 12-15 minutes for sugar in a liquid to have an effect on 
the brain (Benton, 1990). Participants were presented with a movie about sea life 
for 9 minutes before they read information about four hypothetical choice 
options, for instance four cars4 (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). The timing was set 
up so that any effect of glucose would start right after reading of the information. 
Each car was described by twelve attributes. The attributes were either positive 
or negative (e.g., good or bad mileage). One car was characterized by 75% 
positive attributes, two by 50% positive attributes, and one by 25% positive 
attributes. The attributes were presented one by one in random order on a 
computer screen. Each attribute was presented for 4 seconds. After reading the 
information about the four cars, participants were either assigned to a conscious 
thought condition or to an unconscious thought condition. So participants were 
either asked to think about the information carefully for four minutes or were
4 Some participants read information about four hypothetical cars (n=54); some 
about four hypothetical jobs (n=102). (see Online supporting materials of 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006, appendix 1 for insight in the construction of the 
materials). Since there was no effect of materials, F(4,156) = 2.00, p = .159, these 
conditions were collapsed.
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distracted for four minutes (they watched another movie about sea life) and 
were told that they would be asked their opinion of the cars later.
Subsequently, participants gave their attitude towards each of the four 
individual choice options in random order by clicking a score between 1 (“very 
negative”) to 20 (“very positive”).
A subset of the participants received a mood questionnaire (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988). Further analyses revealed no effect of the drinks on 
experienced mood (F<1). Mood was measured after all other dependent 
variables.
Both participants in the unconscious thought glucose and unconscious 
thought non-glucose condition were asked questions about the movie clip, to 
assess whether they had paid attention. Both these conditions performed equally 
well (F<1), scoring an average of 1.33 (SD=1.53) out of 4 in-depth questions 
about the movie.
Results & Discussion
When should we trust conscious deliberation to provide the best results 
and when can we trust unconscious processes? We calculated a difference score 
by subtracting participants’ rating of the worst car from participants’ rating of 
the best car (Bos et al., 2008; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). A higher score on the 
attitude difference measure indicates a greater ability to differentiate between 
choice options. As depicted in Figure 5.1, conscious deliberation improves when 
energy level is high, F(1, 82) = 4.05, p < .05, r¡2 = .05. However, the reverse is true 
for unconscious thought F(1, 74) = 5.90, p < .05, n2 = .05. The two-way interaction 
is significant, F(1,156) = 10.19, p < .01, R2 = .07. In sum, performance of 
conscious thought improves with more energy, whereas performance of 
unconscious thought actually declines after an increase in energy.
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Conscious
Unconscious
Sugar No Sugar
Figure 5.1. Performance after conscious thought and unconscious thought for participants in 
Sugar (high energy) and No sugar (low energy) conditions.
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We found that when we have enough energy, conscious deliberation 
enables us to make good decisions. However, even when we are not able or 
willing to consume large amounts of glucose we need not worry. When we are 
low on energy we should employ another decision strategy: We should trust our 
unconscious.
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Dutch Summary
Wat is de beste manier om een beslissing te nemen? Het gebruikelijke 
antwoord daarop is: Zorg dat je alle nodige informatie hebt en denk vervolgens 
goed na: Weeg alle voors en tegens af en kom op die manier tot een gewogen 
beslissing. Het komt niet zelden voor dat op deze manier een beslissing nemen 
erg moeilijk blijkt te zijn. Simpele beslissingen, zoals een beetje meer zout of 
peper in de pasta, zijn makkelijk gemaakt. Complexe beslissingen daarentegen 
kosten vaak veel tijd en moeite. Er zijn verschillende manieren van een beslissing 
nemen. Sommige mensen gaan direct op hun gevoel af en denken niet verder na. 
Anderen proberen zo goed mogelijk bewust na te denken en weer anderen 
proberen hun onbewuste een deel van het werk te laten doen. Maar wat is nou de 
beste manier?
Onderzoek van de afgelopen jaren heeft aangetoond dat, omdat ons 
bewustzijn een beperkte capaciteit heeft (probeer maar eens meer dan 10 
getallen in gedachten te houden), we bij complexe beslissingen beter op ons 
onbewuste kunnen vertrouwen. Ons onbewuste heeft een veel grotere capaciteit 
dan ons bewuste, dus logischerwijs kan het beter omgaan met grote 
hoeveelheden informatie. Dat leidt tot een conclusie die een beetje verwarrend 
lijkt: Als een beslissing complexer is moeten we er dus eigenlijk minder bewust 
over nadenken. Hoewel die conclusie misschien vreemd klinkt, doen we dit al 
heel lang. Denk maar aan wat je ouders je aanraadden als je een ingewikkelde 
beslissing moest nemen: Slaap er een nachtje over. Of als je even niet op de naam 
van de band kan komen van het liedje dat je hoort. Dan zeg je tegen jezelf: Ik kom 
er zo wel op. Je zegt dan dus tegen jezelf: Ik stop met erover na te denken en dan 
komt het antwoord vanzelf. Het onderzoek dat in dit proefschrift beschreven is 
volgt dezelfde gedachtelijn. Het proces dat actief is als we bijvoorbeeld een 
beslissingsprobleem even wegleggen wordt ‘onbewust nadenken’ genoemd. 
Onbewust nadenken verwijst naar een actief denkproces dat plaatsvindt terwijl 
onze bewuste aandacht op iets anders dan het voorhanden zijnde probleem 
gericht is.
In een serie van experimenten borduren we voort op onderzoek dat laat 
zien dat we over beslissingen beter onbewust kunnen nadenken. In een paar
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experimenten laten we zien dat onbewust nadenken niet werkt als we geen doel 
hebben om informatie te verwerken. Hiermee tonen we aan dat onbewust 
nadenken een actief proces is en niet alleen maar een ‘frisse kijk’ op het 
voorhanden zijnde probleem. Twee andere experimenten tonen aan dat we het 
beste onbewust kunnen nadenken als een beslissing erg complex is. In deze 
experimenten krijgen de deelnemers een grote hoeveelheid informatie te 
verwerken, over bijvoorbeeld 6 huizen. Zelfs als de deelnemers alle informatie 
konden nalezen en alle tijd kregen om een beslissing te nemen presteerden ze 
minder goed dan deelnemers die een beslissing maakten nadat hun bewuste 
aandacht voor een tijdje werd afgeleid. Weer andere experimenten laten zien dat 
onbewust nadenken goed kan presteren onder druk. Als we onze deelnemers 
vertellen dat ze een grote hoeveelheid informatie te verwerken krijgen zou het 
kunnen dat ze ‘dichtslaan’ en hun prestaties gaan lijden onder de druk. Het blijkt 
inderdaad dat dat het geval is als onze deelnemers bewust nadenken. Als onze 
deelnemers onbewust nadenken blijkt de druk ze minder te deren; ze gaan zelfs 
beter presteren.
Glucose is de voornaamste energiebron in ons brein. In onze laatste 
onderzoekslijn laten we zien dat deelnem ers beter presteren op een 
beslissingstaak als ze voor ze over de beslissing na moeten denken frisdrank met 
suiker hebben gekregen. De stijging in bloedsuikerspiegel lijkt ons brein te 
helpen als we bewust denken. Betekent dit dan dat we ons rond moeten eten aan 
suiker om goeie beslissingen te kunnen nemen? Gelukkig niet: Onze laatste 
onderzoekslijn toont aan dat onbewust nadenken prima werkt als we de 
bloedsuikerspiegel niet verhogen.
Wat is de beste manier om een beslissing te nemen? Ons onderzoek laat 
zien dat als een beslissing complex is en als we weinig energie hebben bewust 
nadenken misschien niet de beste manier is om beslissingen te nemen. We 
kunnen het beste alle relevante informatie in ons opnemen en vervolgens ons 
onbewuste het werk laten doen.
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